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Abstract. We show that a linear decomposition attack based on the
decomposition method introduced by the first author in monography [1]
and papers [2], [3], and developed in [4], works by finding the exchanging
key in the protocol in [5].
1. Introduction
In this note we apply a practical deterministic attack on the protocol pro-
posed in [5]. This kind of attack introduced by the first author in [1], [2],
[3] and developed in [4] works when the platform objects are linear. It turns
out that in this case, contrary to the common opinion (and some explicitly
stated security assumptions), one does not need to solve the underlying al-
gorithmic problems to break the scheme, i.e., there is another algorithm that
recovers the private keys without solving the principal algorithmic problem
on which the security assumptions are based. The efficacy of the attack
depends on the platform group, so it requires a specific analysis in each par-
ticular case. In general one can only state that the attack is in polynomial
time in the size of the data, when the platform and related groups are given
together with their linear representations. In many other cases we can ef-
fectively use known linear presentations of the groups under consideration.
A theoretical base for the decomposition method is described in [4] where a
series of examples is presented. The monography [1] solves uniformly many
protocols based on the conjugacy search problem, protocols based on the
decomposition and factorization problems, protocols based on actions by
automorphisms, and a number of other protocols. See also [6] and [7] where
the linear decomposition attack is applied to the main protocols in [8], [9],
and [10].
In a series of works [11], [12] and [13] (see also [14]) Tsaban presented
another general approach for provable polynomial time solutions of compu-
tational problems in groups with efficient, faithful representation as matrix
groups.
All along the paper we denote by N the set of all nonnegative integers,
and by C the set of all complex numbers.
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2. Andrecut’s key exchange protocol [5].
In this section, we describe the Andrecut’s key exchange protocol pro-
posed in [5]. Firstly we introduce a necessary terminology. Then we will
give a cryptanalysis of this protocol.
Let X ∈ Cn×n be a complex matrix of size n× n, that is considered as a
variable. Let
P (X, a) =
M∑
m=1
amX
m and Q(X, b) =
K∑
m=1
bmX
m
be two complex polynomials in X uniquely defined by the complex vectors
of coefficients a = (a0, . . . , aM ) and b = (b0, . . . , bK).
• Alice chooses the secret vectors a ∈ CM1 and a˜ ∈ CM2 (Alice’s
private key).
• Alice randomly generates and publishes the matrix U ∈ Cn×n (Al-
ice’s matrix public key).
• Bob chooses the secret vectors b ∈ CJ1 and b˜ ∈ CJ1 (Bob’s private
key).
• Bob randomly generates and publishes the matrix V ∈ Cn×n (Bob’s
matrix public key).
• Alice computes and publishes the matrix A = P (U, a)P (V, a˜) (Alice’s
public key).
• Bob computes and publishes the matrix B = P (U, b)P (V, b˜) (Bob’s
public key).
• Alice calculates the secret matrix KA = P (U, a)BP (V, a˜).
• Bob calculates the secret matrix KB = P (U, b)AP (V, b˜).
• The established secret key is K = KA = KB .
It is assumed in [5], that the matrices U and V are different to give
the non-commutativity assumption P (U, a)P (V, b) 6= P (V, b)P (U, a) and
P (U, a˜)P (V, b˜) 6= P (V, b˜)P (U, a˜). In general, even more strong assumption
UV 6= V U is not enough for this non-commutativity.
Also, there is a remark in [5] that the following assumption
M1,M2, J1, J2 ≫ n
should be satisfied in order to increase the security. But by the classical
Cayley-Hamilton theorem every matrix U is a root of its own characteristic
polynomial C(X) = det(U −X · In), where In is the identity matrix of size
n × n. The degree of C(X) is exactly n. Then for any matrix U ∈ Cn×n
and every matrix polynomial P (X, a) one has P (U, a) = R(U), where R(X)
is the remainder after division of the polynomial P (X, a) by C(X). Hence,
there is no sense to use in the protocol above polynomials of degrees ≥ n.
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3. Cryptanalysis of the Andrecut’s key exchange protocol [5].
We will provide two approaches to cryptanalysis of the protocol described
in the previous section. The first one is based on some simple facts from
linear algebra and the second one is based on a linear decomposition attack.
As we have seen in the previous section, there is no sense to use values
M1,M2, J1, J2 ≥ n. Thus we can assume that M1 =M2 = J1 = J2 = n− 1.
Consider the linear systems
(3.1)
A =
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aia˜j︸︷︷︸
xij
U iV j ,
B =
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=1
bkb˜l︸︷︷︸
ykl
UkV l
of n2 equations with (n − 1)2 unknowns xij and ykl. Having a solution of
the systems (3.1) one can compute the secret key as follows
(3.2)
K = P (U, a)P (U, b)P (V, a˜)P (V, b˜)
=

n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aibjU
i+j

(n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=1
a˜k b˜lV
k+l
)
=
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=1
aia˜k︸︷︷︸
xik
bj b˜l︸︷︷︸
yjl
U i+jV k+l.
Solution of a system of n equations with n unknowns using Gauss elimination
requires O(n3) time. Thus solution of the systems (3.1) requires O(n6) time.
Having precomputed values U i and V i, for i = 1, . . . , n−1, one can perform
the step (3.2) in O(n7) time. So the overall time complexity for this approach
is O(n7).
Further we will describe the second approach based on a linear decom-
position attack. The algebra Cn×n has a structure of a vector space over C
of dimension n2. Let U¯ be the semigroup generated by U, and let V¯ be the
semigroup generated by V. A basis of the subspace Sp(U¯ V¯ ) can be effectively
constructed as follows. Let
L0 = {In},
L1 = {U, V },
. . .
Li = {U
kV l | k, l ∈ N, k + l = i},
. . .
be the sets of matrices considered as vectors. Define
Vi = Sp(L0 ∪ L1 ∪ · · · ∪ Li),
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for i = 0, 1, . . . , the vector space spanned by the indicated set. We choose a
basis B0 = {b0 = In} of V0, then extend B0 to basis B1 of V1, and so on. If
for some i0 we get Bi0 = Bi0+1, then clearly B = Bi0 is a basis of Sp(U¯ V¯ ).
By the Cayley-Hamilton theorem one has i0 ≤ 2n− 2. In construction of B
we only use the Gauss elimination process that is polynomial. Note, that we
can do it offline, so we will call this phase the offline phase. Let b0, b1, . . . , br
be a basis of Sp(U¯ V¯ ), where bi = U
kiV li . Now we are ready to recover the
secret key K (online phase).
• Since B ∈ Sp(U¯ V¯ ) we can use the Gauss elimination process to
obtain a presentation of B in the form
(3.3) B =
r∑
i=0
αiU
kiV li , αi ∈ C.
• Then we have
(3.4)
r∑
i=0
αiU
kiAV li =
r∑
i=0
αiU
kiP (U, a)P (V, a˜)V li
= P (U, a)
(
r∑
i=0
αiU
kiV li
)
P (V, a˜)
= P (U, a)BP (V, a˜) = K.
Note that a similar protocol by Stickel [15] has been analyzed in [4]. A
linear decomposition attack based on the decomposition method has been
applied.
Now we will provide a rough estimate for the time complexity of the
approach above. Observe that the number of the field operations in Gauss
elimination performed on a matrix of size k × n2 is O(k2n2). A basis of
Sp(U¯ V¯ ) consist of at most n2 elements, so it requires O(n2
∑n2
k=1 k
2) =
O(n8) time to construct it. Computing αi in (3.3) by solving a system
of linear equations using Gauss elimination requires O(n6) time. Having
precomputed values Uki and V li , for i = 0, . . . , r, one can perform the step
(3.4) in O(n5) time. So the offline phase could be done in O(n8) time, the
online phase could be done in O(n6) time, and the overall time complexity
is O(n8).
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